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ABSTRACT
In some of the most established and supposedly immutable liberal democracies,
diverse social groups are losing conﬁdence not only in established democratic
institutions, but in the idea of liberal representative democracy itself. Meanwhile, an
illiberal and anti-egalitarian transformation of democracy evolves at an apparently
unstoppable pace. This democratic fatigue syndrome, the present article suggests, is
qualitatively diﬀerent from the crises of democracy which have been debated for
some considerable time. Focusing on mature democracies underpinned by the
ideational tradition of European Enlightenment, the article theorizes this syndrome
and the striking transformation of democracy in terms of a dialectic process in
which the very norm that once gave birth to the democratic project – the modernist
idea of the autonomous subject – metamorphoses into its gravedigger, or at least
into the driver of its radical reformulation. The article further develops aspects of my
existing work on second-order emancipation and simulative democracy. Taking a
theoretical rather than empirical approach, it aims to provide a conceptual
framework for more empirically oriented analyses of changing forms of political
articulation and participation.
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1. Introduction
The Hegelian tradition understands dialectic as a process in which an idea or social
arrangement (thesis) gives rise to its own counterpart (antithesis), thereby destabilizes
and eventually destroys itself and triggers the emergence of something new (synthesis).
In exactly this sense, the term dialectic of democracy is used here to conceptualize a
process in which the normative core of democracy and democratization – the modernist
idea of the autonomous subject – transmutes from a precondition, facilitator and driver
of the democratic project into a powerful challenge to established notions of democracy
and the motor of their radical transformation. This thinking in terms of a dialectic of
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democracy may be traced back right to Plato’s Republic which states that the “excessive
desire” for its core value, liberty, “is what undermines democracy” and eventually leads
to “its downfall.”1 It draws on Dahl’s understanding of democracy as a perennially open
project,2 and on the hypothesis that democracy is based on, and in a variety of ways
depends on, preconditions or resources which it cannot itself produce, but which it per-
sistently depletes.3 This hypothesis, too, is well known from Plato. In contemporary
democratic theory the ﬁrst dimension, i.e. democracy’s dependence on resources
which it does not itself (re)produce, recurred, in Lipset’s4 argument that in order to
thrive, democracy needs a certain level of economic development (material precondi-
tions). And it had been implicit in Almond and Verba’s5 argument that the “partici-
pation explosion” can only be governed democratically, if it is tamed and moderated
by a strong “civic culture” (cultural preconditions). The second dimension, i.e. democ-
racy’s tendency to deplete these very resources on which it depends and thus endanger
its own stability, had underpinned, inter alia, concerns in the 1970s that growing citizen
demands might lead into a condition of “state overload” and “ungovernability”6, and
much later resurfaced, for example, in Putnam’s7 work on the erosion of “social capital.”
Around the turn to the new millennium, theorists of post-democracy then pointed
much more explicitly to a dialectic of democracy. Rancière, for example, suggested
that the force of homogenization and consensus, on the one hand, and the preservation
of plurality and conﬂict, on the other, are the two antipodes built into the democratic
project, with the former persistently diminishing the potential for the latter and thus
powering democracy’s evolution towards post-democracy.8 Similarly, Colin Crouch
diagnosed an “inevitable” and “irreversible entropy” of democracy and described the
trajectory of politics and democracy in terms of a “parabola.”9 More recently, Mitchell,
Streeck, Hausknost and many others10 renewed the argument that for its own stabiliz-
ation and reproduction modern democracy depends on material prerequisites which it
does not (re)produce. And, focusing on the non-material side, Eribon, Lilla, Inglehart
and many others,11 argued that the rise of right-wing populism, which many perceive
as the most serious threat to liberal democracy,12 has to be understood as a cultural
backlash13 triggered, more than anything, by the value preferences and pre-occupations
of those well-educated, liberal and cosmopolitan middle classes, who since the 1970s
have conceived of themselves as the avant-garde of the progressive democratic project.
So, at least implicitly, constitutive elements of what is conceptualized here as the dia-
lectic of democracy have been debated for some considerable time. But the mainstream
literature on democracy and democratization has so far not pursued them in any great
detail –most probably because such debates raise fundamental questions about the sus-
tainability of democracy, in both its democracy-related and eco-political meanings.14
Indeed, the idea that liberal democracy – or indeed democracy more generally – may
not be sustainable, materially, culturally and/or ecologically, is radically incompatible
with the self-perception and self-descriptions of industrialized countries in the northern
hemisphere as the most advanced on the trajectory of modernization and democratiza-
tion, signposting the path of development for others to follow. Hence, for normative
democratic theory, in particular, the very thought of the possible unsustainability of
democracy is highly problematic.
Empirically, however, the spread of the “democratic fatigue syndrome” now diag-
nosed by a wide range of observers,15 renders more detailed engagement with this
idea imperative. For, in comparison to the crises of democracy which have been
debated for a number of decades,16 this democratic fatigue syndrome has a new and
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very diﬀerent quality: In modern consumer societies, these observers say, diverse social
groups, each for diﬀerent reasons, are losing conﬁdence not only in established demo-
cratic institutions, but in the very idea of democracy itself. Rancière even diagnoses “a
new hatred of democracy,”17 which he traces to the perception of a dialectic metamor-
phosis of democracy from the promise of “the recognition, as equals and as political
subjects”18 to all those whose rights and voice have so far remained oppressed, into
“an anthropological catastrophe” and the “self-destruction of humanity.”19 Democratic
innovations, ranging from changes to electoral systems via reforms to political parties to
new means of democratic engagement and, most recently, experiments with digital
democracy, have not been able, it seems, to cure this fatigue or even hatred of democ-
racy. Instead, an illiberal, anti-egalitarian and authoritarian transformation of democ-
racy evolves at an apparently unstoppable pace. How may this fatigue with
democracy be explained? What is the apparently unstoppable dynamic that powers
democracy’s ongoing transformation? Why do the manifold appeals and practical
attempts to re-energize the democratic project have so limited impact?
Observers following the post-Marxist critical tradition see the “fundamental cause of
democratic decline” in the growing imbalance “between the role of corporate interests
and those of virtually all other groups.”20 There is much to be said for this explanation.
Yet, the diagnosis of a democratic fatigue syndrome points beyond post-Marxist
notions of the oppression of democracy towards some kind of exhaustion. Aiming to
supplement – not to refute – the well-rehearsed post-Marxist argument, the present
article therefore follows up the above hypothesis that in contemporary consumer
societies, liberal democracy – and other forms of democracy, too – fall victim to an
inherent dialectic, i.e. that the dynamic of democratization itself persistently depletes
and destroys the foundations of the democratic project. This thinking in terms of a dia-
lectic further develops aspects of my earlier work on democracy in European(ized) con-
sumer societies.21 More speciﬁcally, the article elaborates the idea that, in the wake of its
own evolution, the very ideal which once initiated and propelled the democratic project
– the modernist notion of the autonomous subject – incrementally metamorphoses into
the most serious threat to liberal democracy and all other forms of democracy grounded
on this norm.
The next section is devoted to this idea of the autonomous subject; it recalls diﬀerent
accounts of the status and signiﬁcance of this norm in modern consumer democracies.
Section three focuses in on the prevailing ways in which this norm is being interpreted
in contemporary consumer societies. It develops the concept of reﬂexive or second-order
emancipation which seeks to capture that processes of modernization and emancipa-
tion incrementally suspend established understandings of this norm and reframe its
meaning. From this particular perspective, section four then explains the democratic
fatigue syndrome and investigates the ongoing reconﬁguration of the democratic
project. The concluding section reﬂects on the conceptualization of the ongoing trans-
formation of contemporary democracy as a “great regression.”22 Furthermore, it con-
siders whether the diagnosis and analysis of a dialectic of democracy might itself be
an anti-democratic and reactionary project.
2. The autonomous subject and its (in)signiﬁcance
Beyond the more empirically applicable criteria which are commonly used to dis-
tinguish democratic from non-democratic systems and to assess their relative
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democratic quality, the Enlightenment idea of the autonomous subject, i.e. the idea of
the human being as the subject of inalienable freedom, rights and dignity, is the norma-
tive core of modern democracy.23 It entails the individual right to liberty, equality and
self-determination and the right of the collective subject, the people, to self-government,
i.e. to sovereignty. Not all proponents of this ideal, which Enlightenment philosophy
installed as the very foundation of European modernity more generally, have favoured
democracy; but, on the other hand, all deﬁnitions of democracy (and the empirically
applicable criteria to assess democratic systems) are based on this ideal. In practical
terms, the autonomous subject has always been a promise and ambition rather than
an accomplished reality. It has been interpreted in a variety of diﬀerent ways and,
accordingly, has given rise to diverse forms of democracy. Yet, democracy and demo-
cratization have always been about the formation of political subjects and their struggle
for equal rights, recognition and self-determination. Had it not been for this norm and
ideal of the autonomous subject, the democratic project would never have emerged in
the ﬁrst place; and ever since its emergence, the unfulﬁlled promise of autonomy has
been the motor powering – and the norm legitimating – democratic movements and
progressive politics. In any particular polity and at any given point in time, the domi-
nant interpretations of the autonomous subject condition the shape and public percep-
tion of democracy. Hence, the understandings of autonomy and subjectivity prevailing
in established post-industrial consumer democracies, and the overall signiﬁcance of this
central norm in these polities’ public discourse, are the key to understanding both their
democratic fatigue syndrome and the ongoing transformation of democracy.
With the transition of modern societies from their industrial to the post-industrial
stage of development, this modernist norm of the autonomous subject gained substan-
tially in political signiﬁcance.24 For the increasingly educated and politically articulate
middle classes, in particular, values of self-determination, self-expression and self-
realization became a priority concern.25 Hence, the new social movements since the
late 1960s pursued an agenda of democratization and new politics26 aiming for the lib-
eration from the imperatives of religion, tradition and state authority. Intellectually,
these movements – and related, newly emerging academic sub-disciplines such as
social movement research or environmental sociology – were strongly inspired by
the Marxist and post-Marxist tradition of critical social theory, which placed the
norm of the autonomous subject at the very centre of their societal analysis. Critical the-
orists were interested, in particular, in the societal power relations obstructing the
realization of this norm. From their perspective, consumer capitalism was the
primary obstacle. The advertising, culture and consumer industries were seen to colo-
nize the human being and enforce its subjugation, manipulation and mutilation. They
obstructed the realization of autonomy and the authentic self – not only for the working
class, but for modern citizens in general. And beyond the power of capitalism, the
instrumental rationality of technological and administrative modernity more generally,
were seen to relentlessly oppress the human being, thwarting its ambition for
autonomy.
Thus, the categories of alienation and liberation, oppression and emancipation,
became constitutive to the agenda of the new social movements and the academic main-
stream in the critical social sciences, often paired with the assumption that the authentic
self, the autonomous subject and a good life for all can be realized only beyond the
established order of consumer capitalism. In line with Weberian thinking, Horkheimer
and Adorno had, early on, relativized the power and agency of capitalism pointing, in
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addition, to a dynamic of modernization, a dialectic of Enlightenment,27 that left much
less agency and control to capitalist elites than orthodox Marxists might accredit them.
Similarly, Marcuse had anticipated that “in advanced industrial society” the conven-
iences of the consumer culture might eventually “make the very notion of alienation
questionable” and confront the (post-)Marxist critique of society “with a situation
that seems to deprive it of its very basis.”28 And Gramsci, too, had suggested that the
victory of capitalism cannot be explained only as a process forcefully imposed by capi-
talist elites, but also relies on popular consent and cooperation.29 His concepts of cul-
tural hegemony and the integral state seek to capture a kind of consonance rather
than antagonism between modern citizens and the logic ruling their societies. Still, criti-
cal theorists, social movement activists and politically committed social scientists ﬁrmly
held on to the belief in the truly authentic self which may be realized only beyond con-
sumer capitalism and the logic of industrial modernity. Indeed, the new social move-
ments since the 1970s embedded the norm of the autonomous subject as well as the
categories of alienation and liberation more broadly and ﬁrmly in western post-indus-
trial societies than ever before.
Already in the mid-1970s, however, Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory radically
challenged this subject-centrism of the critical and activist tradition. Luhmann’s meta-
critical project of sociological enlightenment30 sought to reveal that, whatever the nor-
mative claims of political constitutions, social movements and critical theorists, the
notion of the autonomous subject is not helpful as the central category of social
theory and societal analysis. Factually, modern society and its ongoing development,
Luhmann argued, are neither about the incremental realization of Enlightenment
ideals, nor about processes of value and culture change that render contemporary
societies ever more authentically democratic. Instead, they are driven by a logic of func-
tional diﬀerentiation which renders modern societies ever more complex, progressively
marginalizes the human individual and its value orientations, derides its claims to
autonomy, and undermines the ability of politicians, and politics in general, to steer,
coordinate and control societal development.
Similar to most critical theorists, social systems theorists, too, have taken no particu-
lar interest in the ongoing reframing of prevalent notions of identity, subjectivity or
autonomy. Nor have they considered that the claims to self-determination and auton-
omy may not easily give way to the rule of modern society’s function systems.31 They
underestimated the political energy which the persistent marginalization of individual
and collective needs for identity, subjectivity and autonomy can release,32 and the
agency and impact related counter-movements may have. Yet, their post-critical and
post-subjective social theory, in a sense, further pursued Marcuse’s dystopian suspicion
that in the wake of societal development the category of alienation – as well as the norm
to which it refers – might incrementally lose its mobilizing force. Their analysis of pol-
itical protest movements correctly highlighted that such movements actually reinforce
the logic of modernization (diﬀerentiation) at least as much as they challenge it.33 And
systems-theoretical thinking anticipated a post-subjective condition and society which
the neoliberal and the digital revolutions then rendered much more empirically tangible
than Luhmann himself had ever imagined.
Indeed, the hegemony of neoliberal thought since the second half of the 1990s ﬁrmly
anchored in mainstream societal discourse the belief that to the rule of the market there
is no alternative and that the supposedly autonomous subject, if the category is to be
retained at all, ought to be understood as the autonomous consumer freely selecting,
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in any particular situation of their everyday life, from the range of choices provided by
the market. The banking and ﬁnancial crisis since 2008 then triggered a certain resur-
gence of post- and neo-Marxist thinking.34 Yet, taking the neo-liberal marginalization
of autonomy and subjectivity a major step further, the digital revolution has now set out
to fully suspend not only the norm of the autonomous subject, but the entity of the
human individual, too, as relevant points of reference. Whilst Luhmann had already
relocated human beings and their claims to autonomy and subjectivity from the very
centre of sociological theory and analysis into the environment of modern society’s
autonomous function systems, the digital revolution further radicalizes this marginali-
zation: It perceives and calculates human individuals and their social relations as an
inﬁnite mass of digital data to be collected and selectively arranged into data proﬁles,
which increasingly become the pertinent point of reference for evidence-based public
policy, for economic decision making, for political strategists, and for any other data
users.35
Measured by this truly revolutionary sidelining of the very core of Enlightenment
thinking and European modernity, the societal response to the digital revolution is
revealingly restrained. Curiously, this progressive suspension of the norm of the auton-
omous subject does not seem to trigger major feelings of alienation; or, as Marcuse had
put it already in the early 1970s, there is a striking “prevalence of a non-revolutionary –
nay, antirevolutionary – consciousness” in contemporary consumer societies. Indeed,
“the highest stage of capitalist development” seems to correspond to “the low of revolu-
tionary potential.”36 To the extent that the digital revolution, pushed by most govern-
ments as a priority project and widely perceived by the public as a welcome, or at least
inescapable development, is a matter for critical debates at all, concerns focus on its
impact on employment opportunities in automated factories and the digitalized
service sector, on the probability of a further polarization of societal wealth and an
aggravation of social inequality in artiﬁcial intelligence society,37 or on the rise of the
surveillance state well beyond the Orwellian dystopia.38 As regards its impact on
democracy, there are hopes that the digital revolution might entail new opportunities
for citizen-empowerment and, contrarily, concerns about the impact of the digital revo-
lution on the quality of public political discourse.39 Yet, the really crucial issue that the
digital revolution rapidly and radically erodes the factual relevance of the autonomous
subject, whose free volition, inalienable rights, intrinsic value and intangible dignity had
been the very core of democracy and its practices of participation, representation and
legitimation, largely escapes public attention, and has not yet found much resonance
in democratic theory either. Still, the digital revolution and the rise of artiﬁcial intelli-
gence fully implement what, a fairly short time ago, the post-Marxist critics of social
systems theory had still regarded as a horrendous and entirely unacceptable provoca-
tion: a society and modernity beyond the norm of the autonomous subject. Indeed,
the digital revolution marks the transition to a post-subjective modernity – and to a
new form of democracy beyond its established normative core.40
3. Reﬂexive emancipation or the liberation from maturity
The conspicuous absence of any major “revolutionary potential” suggests that in con-
temporary consumer societies the norm of the autonomous subject and the claims of
modern individuals to self-determination and self-realization are not simply oppressed
– as post-Marxist analysis in terms of alienation, colonization and domination asserts;
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but this norm and these expectations have either become exhausted or they have been
reframed in such a way that they no longer conﬂict with the factual realities and devel-
opment of digital consumer capitalism and, accordingly, no longer release much revo-
lutionary energy. Neither critical theory nor systems theory had devoted much
attention to spelling out what exactly the full realization of the authentic autonomous
subject might imply in practical terms; nor had they been particularly interested in
the continuous change of prevailing interpretations of authentic autonomy and subjec-
tivity. The former had fully focused on the power structures which alienate, colonize
and suppress the autonomy of the subject but had never been particularly explicit
exactly what authentic self-determination and the liberated subject might imply in
empirical terms. The latter had fully focused on modern society’s function systems
and their respective logics of operation and self-reproduction and had regarded
human beings and their normative claims to autonomy as largely irrelevant. Yet, as
regards the perception of democratic institutions and the transformation of the demo-
cratic project, exactly this ongoing reinterpretation of the norm of autonomy and sub-
jectivity is crucial.
Social theorists such as Beck and Giddens41 had pointed out that in advanced modern
societies, citizens not only have ever higher expectations in terms of self-determination
and self-fulﬁlment, but increasingly pursue their identity construction and self-realiz-
ation as a self-managed project seeking liberation from established social imperatives,
authorities and predetermination by tradition. Beck had talked of a reinvention of poli-
tics42 and Giddens of a new life politics43 which entail a signiﬁcant increase in demands
for democratic participation and better political representation. Beck, in particular, had
suggested that this reinvention of politics and the second modernity which emerges in its
wake would have the potential to address and repair the democratic deﬁcits of the estab-
lished institutions and socio-political order. Similarly, Inglehart had suggested that the
persistent rise in values of self-determination and self-expression would be conducive
to the emergence of democracy in countries where it does not already exist and its
further deepening where it does. Empirically, he “ﬁnds a remarkably strong correlation
between Self-expression values and eﬀective democracy.” The “most important eﬀect of
modernization,” he argues, is that it “increases ordinary citizens’ capabilities and willing-
ness to struggle for democratic institutions.”44
Inglehart places great emphasis on the rise of self-expression values and on the sig-
niﬁcance of his political culture approach to explaining the development of democracy
in contemporary societies. He conceptualizes “cultural change” as “a process through
which societies adapt their survival strategies”45 and regards “the underlying cultural
demand”46 as a key parameter determining the development of democracy. Strangely,
however, he never explores in any detail what kind of self or identity these values are
supposed to construct and express, what kind of democracy they might promote –
and how cultural change, i.e. the continuous reframing of prevailing notions of auton-
omy, identity and subjectivity, might aﬀect the dominant understandings of democracy.
He works with a rather simplistic linear model according to which more demand for
freedom and choice translates into more democracy, but he does not consider that the
ongoing process of modernization and rising demands for self-determination and
self-expression might also be detrimental to democracy or propel the adaptive reformu-
lation of the democratic project. Even the current tide of right-wing populism he simply
interprets as a “cultural backlash,” i.e. a return to earlier preferences for security values,
eﬀecting an unexpected “democratic recession” which will, however, he argues, be just a
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short term deviation from the normal trajectory of modernization and democratiza-
tion.47 For the hypothesis of the dialectic of democracy, however, exactly this relation-
ship between the rise of self-expression values and the supposedly linear improvement
of democracy in modern consumer societies is the crucial point. For, it suggests that
whilst in the 1970s and 1980s the modernization-induced, emancipatory shift in
value preferences and the rise of self-expression values has indeed been conducive to
the spread and deepening of (a particular kind of) democracy, the further continuation
of this emancipatory agenda of self-determination, self-realization and self-expression,
rather than its reversal, eﬀects today’s democratic fatigue syndrome, the recession of
democracy and its obvious transformation into illiberal, exclusive and authoritarian
varieties of democracy.
Indeed, in contemporary consumer societies, dominant notions of autonomy and
subjectivity, and prevailing patterns of identity construction and self-realization have
changed quite substantially. In particular, ongoing processes of modernization and
diﬀerentiation – strongly reinforced by the neoliberal logic of competitiveness and
self-responsibility – have continued to disembed modern individuals from traditional
social contexts and relations and increased the relative signiﬁcance of individual
forms of self-realization as opposed to collective identities and subjectivity.48 Further-
more, the consumer market has become the primary arena for self-construction, self-
realization and self-articulation.49 Already in the early 1960s Marcuse had noted that
in advanced industrial societies people are ever less inclined to seek the realization of
their autonomous Self and authentic identity beyond the market and the consumer
industry: “People recognise themselves in their commodities,” he suggested, and
“ﬁnd their soul in their automobile, hi-ﬁ set” or other consumer items.50 As in advanced
post-industrial societies the consumer industry has permeated virtually all dimensions
of individual experience and social relations, the project of self-determination and self-
realization implies, less than ever, the emancipation from and radical abolition of the
consumer industry, but aims, instead, for self-realization and self-optimization within
the framework of digitalized consumer capitalism.51
Thirdly, the logic of diﬀerentiation and fragmentation, which according to systems
theorists has restructured modern societies into an assemblage of mutually incompati-
ble and exclusive function systems, has also recast the Christian-bourgeois ideal of the
unitary, consistent and stable identity, and pushed what Sennett described as the cor-
rosion of character.52 As in a context of ever accelerating innovation and change53 con-
temporary individuals are, as Inglehart put it, “adapting their survival strategies,”
traditional norms of character and identity are giving way to more ﬂexible and
multi-facetted forms of liquid identity which are more suited to the requirements of
liquid modernity.54 And alongside this diﬀerentiation of the (ideally) identical
subject, the public space diﬀerentiates as well, breaking down into ever smaller,
mutually insulated discursive arenas (ﬁlter bubbles, echo chambers), which do not
interact with each other, i.e. which do not engage in cross-boundary communication
and deliberation in the Habermasian agreement-oriented sense.55 Instead, they fully
focus on the generation and reproduction of their own internal and self-referential nar-
ratives of meaning. Even at the level of the individual, this diﬀerentiation and liquefac-
tion of traditional norms of identity renders the project of subjectiﬁcation, i.e. the
constitution and maintenance of moral, rational and political subjects extremely
diﬃcult; for the constitution of collective political subjects this is even more pertinent.
Whilst these mutually exclusive discursive spaces, quite evidently, do serve to constitute,
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maintain, perform and experience identities, these are highly fractional identities with
no physical equivalent outside the respective discursive arena. In particular, these frac-
tional identities do not easily translate into political subjectivities which can participate
and be represented in political systems assuming that one person speaks with one voice
and, accordingly, is granted one vote.
At a more abstract level, this cultural change, this ongoing modernization of preva-
lent notions of autonomy, subjectivity and self-expression, may be conceptualized as the
emancipation from restrictions, commitments and responsibilities which had come
along with the Kantian notion of autonomy and maturity. Kant had famously concep-
tualized Enlightenment as mankind’s emergence from its self-imposed immaturity.56 For
Kant this had implied the acquisition of the capability – individually and collectively –
to be ruled by reason and commit to categorical imperatives (duties) which would
tightly restrain (civilize) individual desires, impulses and instincts, engender the
dignity of human beings, facilitate social equality, justice, inclusion and wellbeing,
and eventually give rise to a cosmopolitan society and perpetual peace.57 Exactly these
were core ideas – though not the only ones – which had guided the emancipatory
project of the progressive new social movements and which, up to the present, underpin
the critique of right-wing populist movements as regressive and uncivilized.58 Exactly
this understanding of autonomy and subjectivity also informed those theories of
democracy which understand democracy and democratization as an educational and
transformative project aiming for the formation of the mature citizen, capable of orga-
nizing and managing public aﬀairs based on the principle of communicative reason,
collective agreement and for the beneﬁt of the common good.59
In as much as this cultural change described by Bauman, Sennett, Reckwitz and
many others60 entails the reﬂexive liberation from, or at least an emancipatory revision
of, these core principles which had been constitutive to the Kantian understanding of
autonomy and subjectivity, this “adaptation of survival strategies” may be conceptual-
ized as second-order emancipation.61 The term suggests that one set of emancipatory
values that once underpinned earlier progressive movements is being replaced by a
revised set of values which guide today’s forms of emancipation. Second-order eman-
cipation is emancipatory in that it promises new means of and spaces for self-realiz-
ation; it extends the boundaries of the possible and the range of opportunities for
self-realization. In line with Beck’s notion of reﬂexive modernization second-order
emancipation might also be referred to as reﬂexive emancipation or, referring back to
Kant, as the emergence of contemporary individuals and societies from their self-
imposed maturity. From today’s point of view, this Kantian maturity appears unduly
restrictive, inﬂexible and overall incompatible with the requirements of contemporary
consumer societies. The revision of this norm is powered by a dialectic of emancipation
which, qua being emancipatory, cannot accept any boundaries, is inherently transgres-
sive and, invariably, also questions (politicizes) its own foundations which had
remained unchallenged (pre-political) so far. Second-order emancipation and the liber-
ation from earlier commitments which are now experienced as unduly restrictive might
be associated, in particular, with the educated and progressive middle classes which are
well endowed with various forms of capital waiting to be made productive.62 Yet, it also
underpins neoliberal thinking63 as well as the right-wing populist project which expli-
citly revolts against established norms of decency, maturity and being civilized.64 For a
diﬀerentiated understanding of what is conceptualized here as the dialectic of democ-
racy, this dialectic of emancipation is essential.
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4. Democratic dysfunctionality and the reconﬁguration of the
democratic project
Against this background, the democratic fatigue syndrome and the transformation of
democracy occurring in many of the most established democratic polities may now
be explained in terms of a multiple dysfunctionality of democracy. More speciﬁcally,
drawing on the distinction between the systemic performance (problem solving
capacity) and democratic performance (ability to deliver to speciﬁcally democratic
expectations) of political systems65, the democratic fatigue syndrome may be explained
as the eﬀect of a perceived systemic dysfunctionality and democratic dysfunctionality of
democracy. And in light of the digital revolution, in particular, these two are sup-
plemented by a third form of dysfunctionality that might be labelled mechanical dys-
functionality in a quite literal sense.
The ﬁrst of these three dimensions, systemic dysfunctionality, denotes the limited
problem-solving capacity of democracy. It has been debated since the 1990s, at the
very latest. Societal diﬀerentiation, technological development, the dynamics of globa-
lization and so forth steadily increase the complexity of modern societies, render their
problems and crises ever more unpredictable, and persistently reduce the steering
capacity of government institutions. Democratic systems, in particular, become struc-
turally inadequate for the government of advanced modern societies.66 Whilst political
institutions are creaking under the pressure of ever more, and ever more erratic, politi-
cal participation,67 citizens claiming their “right to competent government”68 are
“losing faith in democratic government and its suitability”69 for resolving the mounting
problems to be addressed. Already in the 1990s, reform governments set out to moder-
nize democratic politics, seeking to increase its eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness by devolving
decision making capacities to non-majoritarian expert bodies. Yet, given the dynamic of
modernization, these strategies did little to overcome the structural problems of democ-
racy. Whilst challenges such as social inequality, global warming, migration and notor-
iously low rates of economic growth are becoming ever more complex and urgent,
democratic institutions retain little ability to plan, direct, regulate and coordinate
societal development. Most strikingly perhaps, the ﬁeld of climate and sustainability
policy has recently been aﬀected by a notable collapse of conﬁdence in democratic
governance.70
The second dimension, i.e. the emancipatory dysfunctionality of democracy, refers to
the unsuitability of egalitarian and inclusive notions of democracy, in particular, as a
political tool for purposes of self-realization, self-expression and self-experience.
Given the value and culture shift outlined above, i.e. given the understandings of
self-realization and self-experience prevailing in contemporary consumer societies,
democracy and democratization, which had once been the most important tool for
the emancipatory project, increasingly turn into a burden and obstacle. Democratic
institutions and processes can neither articulate nor represent the complexity and ﬂexi-
bility of modern individuals and their identity needs, nor can they respond to the
dynamics of modern lifestyles and the reality of the competitive struggle for social
opportunities. And in a societal constellation where strongly consumption based
(resource intensive) understandings of autonomy, subjectivity and identity clash, ever
more openly, with biophysical limits and persistently low economic growth, the demo-
cratic principles of egalitarianism, social justice and social inclusion become a major
obstacle to individual freedom and self-realization. Modern lifestyles, conceptualized
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as the imperial mode of living71 in today’s externalization societies,72 are fundamentally
based on the principles of social as well as ecological inequality and exclusion; their
defence demands that democracy is either abandoned or comprehensively reframed.
The third dimension of democratic dysfunctionality, labelled here mechanical dys-
functionality, refers to the breakdown of democracy due to the corrosion of its most
central constitutive element, the idea of the autonomous subject. While the previous
two forms of dysfunctionality consider the usefulness of democratic processes and insti-
tutions as a tool for particular purposes, this third dimension concerns the viability of
the democratic project itself. More speciﬁcally, to the same extent to which claims to
autonomy and subjectivity are not only oppressed by the forces of capitalism, and
not just marginalized by functional diﬀerentiation and the rule of the function
systems’ codes, but reframed in consonance with the oﬀerings of consumer capitalism
and actually dissolved in the dual process of liquiﬁcation and dataﬁcation (digitaliza-
tion); put diﬀerently, to the same extent that in digitalized consumer societies the
norm of the autonomous subject evaporates, the categories of alienation and emancipa-
tion become exhausted, and the democratic project – which had never been a purpose in
itself, but a political tool for the realization of the unfulﬁlled promise of autonomy and
subjectivity – simply implodes. “However far post-democracy advances,” Crouch had
suggested, “it is unlikely that it will exhaust the capacity for new social identities to
form, to become aware of their outsider status in the political system, and to make
both noisy and articulate demands for admission.”73 Yet, to the extent that these
social identities are based on, rather than opposed to, the logic of consumer capitalism
and its imperial mode of living, these “noisy and articulate demands” will be directed
not against consumer capitalism, but against the egalitarian, inclusive or even redistri-
butive institutions of democracy – which from this perspective are experienced as
counter-productive and an obstacle. And to the same extent that the digital revolution
suspends the project of subjectivation replacing it with the new project of objectiﬁca-
tion, i.e. to the extent that it makes the empirical data set rather than the autonomous
subject the relevant point of reference for political, economic and any other form of
decision making, democratic procedures become simply irrelevant.
In this scenario, a dual transformation of democracy is predictable – and indeed
empirically occurring. Firstly, democracy, which has always been an essentially con-
tested concept and a perennially open project, metamorphoses from a regime protecting
the inviolable rights of every human being, guaranteeing equality and inclusion, and
favouring the political emancipation of minorities into a regime that secures the
power of majorities, generates political legitimation for ever higher levels of social
inequality, and organizes the socio-ecological exclusion which for the defence of
modern lifestyles and aspirations for self-realization is conditio sine qua non. This is
most visible in the politics of right-wing populism which – by no means solely for
the beneﬁt of the often-cited losers of modernization74 – demands more direct democ-
racy so as to push the fortiﬁcation of external borders and, internally, the exclusion of
non-deserving minorities and enemies of the people.
Secondly, the performative – in a theatrical sense – dimension of democracy gains
much in signiﬁcance. Crouch and other theorists have suggested that in what they
are calling post-democracy, democratic processes and institutions degenerate into a
mere spectacle and empty ritual. But these procedures and institutions are, in fact,
neither an empty spectacle, nor are they just a strategy employed by self-interested
elites to manipulate and deceive the masses. In a context where traditional notions of
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subjectivity, identity, character, dignity and so forth have become counter-productive
and are being revised, but have, as yet, by no means been fully abandoned; in a
context where the digital revolution determinedly pursues the objectiﬁcation and depo-
liticization of the supposedly autonomous self, taking the liquiﬁcation of subjectivity
further towards its liquidation, these processes and institutions are much better under-
stood as practices and arenas for the recreational performance of subjectivity. Rather
than as the transition to post-democracy, the ongoing transformation of liberal repre-
sentative democracy is, therefore, more suitably conceptualized as the emergence of
simulative democracy.75 The practices and institutions of simulative democracy cater
to the desire to reconstruct, maintain and experience the kind of subjectivity that
second-order emancipation critically challenges, but which still retains some normative
force. They cater, in a sense, to the remains of post-Marxian experiences of alienation
and the paradox that in modern consumer societies, expectations in terms of demo-
cratic participation, representation and responsiveness continue to rise whilst, at the
same time, the structural transformation of political subjectivities, the public sphere
and society at large destroy the constitutive elements of which democracy consists.
This performative dimension is not categorically new but has always been constitu-
tive to democracy. Yet, in contrast to the anticipatory performance of subjectivity,
autonomy and sovereignty which has always been at the heart of progressive, avant-
garde politics, the practices of simulative politics are recreational or regenerative, not
preﬁgurative.76 Rather than with the experimental anticipation of alternatives waiting
to be upscaled to the level of society at large, simulative politics is concerned with
the experiential niche-cultivation of the echoes of ﬁrst-order emancipation. Its practices
are recreational ﬁrstly in the sense that they focus on the performative reconstitution of
notions and norms of subjectivity which, beyond the respective arenas, are being
liqueﬁed and liquidated. And secondly, these practices and arenas allow for a recupera-
tive break from the agenda and logic that, outside these recreational arenas, govern indi-
vidual life and modern societies at large. As the (emancipatory) liquefaction and
(digital) objectivation of subjectivity move ahead, this recreational performance of sub-
jectivity has a compensatory and therapeutic function. Practices of simulative democ-
racy are the performative recentralization of the marginalized, liqueﬁed and
objectivated subject. Whilst actual policy- and decision-making – in order to be evi-
dence-based, fair and eﬃcient – becomes increasingly based on data-mining and algor-
ithms, and political discourse and competition are relocating into the realm of post-
rationality, post-truth and alternative facts, democracy evolves into a set of practices
and institutions concerned with the recreational performance and experience of
those norms which the new modernity leaves behind.77
5. A great regression?
Where does this leave us with regard to the democratic fatigue syndrome, the apparently
unstoppable transformation of democracy, and the limited impact of the manifold
moral appeals and practical attempts to re-energize the democratic project. This
article has argued that beyond the simplistic narratives oﬀered by post-Marxist critical
theorists, on the one hand, and systems- or complexity-theorists, on the other, the pro-
liferation of anti-democratic sentiments, the recession of liberal democracy and the
radical reformulation of the democratic project may be traced to a dialectic of emanci-
pation that, by hollowing out democracy’s normative core and point of reference, gives
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rise to the perception of a multiple dysfunctionality of democracy which, in turn, trig-
gers the reformulation of the democratic project. The analysis has demonstrated that
the development of democracy can indeed be described in terms of a parabola. But
while Crouch and many others remain conﬁdent that the old democratic project can
somehow be revived and the direction of the democratic parabola reversed, the argu-
ment here has been that the dialectic of emancipation and the dynamic driving the
transformation of the democratic project can most probably not be unhinged. In con-
trast to Inglehart’s reassurances that “there is no need to panic” because the current
“recession of democracy” and the tide of right-wing populism are but cyclical phenom-
ena which “in the long run” will not disrupt the normal “dynamics of modernization
and democracy,”78 the argument developed here has been that exactly this dynamics
of modernization accounts for the democratic fatigue syndrome. And whilst Inglehart
is convinced that the “rising emphasis on Self-expression values erodes the legitimacy of
authoritarian systems,”79 the argument here is that – beyond a certain point – exactly
this emphasis triggers an authoritarian dynamic. Yet, for democracy and the democratic
project this is, indeed, not “the end of the line,”80 but the metamorphosis into a new
phenotype that is radically diﬀerent from the forms of democracy (liberal, pluralist, ega-
litarian, justice-oriented and deliberative) associated with ﬁrst-order emancipation. The
dialectic of emancipation leads to the reconstruction of the democratic project on very
diﬀerent normative foundations.
Thus, analysis in terms of a dialectic makes an important contribution to under-
standing (post-)democracy and (de-)democratization in aﬄuent consumer societies –
yet, a normatively contentious one. In a number of respects, it takes up concerns
which had been articulated in Plato’s Republic, which fuelled the ungovernability
debate of the 1970s, and which Rancière returns to when discussing the “democratic
paradox”81 that in modern societies, democratic institutions are no longer “capable
of controlling […] democratic life”:82 What provokes the crisis of democracy, Rancière
suggests, “is nothing other than the intensity of democratic life,”83 and worries about
“democratic excess”84 trigger concerns about democracy turning into “the great cata-
strophe of civilization, the synonyms of which are consumerism […] and immatur-
ity.”85 Yet, in the 1970s, the debate on state overload and ungovernability had an
explicitly conservative orientation; and Rancière, too, rejects the critique of the “demo-
cratic excess” as the misguided analysis of intellectuals whose hatred of democracy just
plays into the hands of those harbouring the “intense wish […] to govern without the
people.”86 These intellectuals’ critique is complicit, Rancière argues, with the elites’
“natural compulsion for oligarchic government: the compulsion to get rid of the
people and of politics.”87 By way of conclusion it is, therefore, appropriate, ﬁrstly, to
reconsider the more common assessment of the crisis and metamorphosis of democracy
in terms of an “authoritarian reﬂex”88 and “great regression”89 and, secondly, to reﬂect
whether the above analysis in terms of second-order emancipation and the dysfunction-
ality of democracy may itself be regressive or reactionary.
From the perspective of traditional, ﬁrst-order emancipation, the proliferation of
anti-democratic sentiments and the noticeable transformation of democracy does, of
course, appear as regressive decivilization and a silent counter-revolution.90 Yet, such
conceptualizations are closer to political campaigning than academic analysis. They
are based on normative foundations which they are unable and unwilling to question.
Rather than contributing to the explanation and analysis of societal and political trans-
formations, they focus, primarily, on the construction and maintenance of particular
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self-perceptions and self-descriptions. They tend to assign responsibility for the crisis of
democracy to particular social groups who are accused of being irrational, immoral and
anti-democratic. In that they draw a clear line between the civilized and the uncivilized,
such normative discourses have a strongly performative and experiential quality. Aca-
demically, however, they are even counter-productive because they conceal that the
post-democratic and authoritarian dynamic visible in some of the most established
democratic societies is, arguably, at least as much about the defence of progressive
emancipatory achievements – which are, however, socially exclusive and ecologically
destructive, as they are about a regressive “backlash against cultural change.”91 And
they conceal that in this politics of unsustainability92 there is a close relationship,
indeed a tacit complicity, between those portraying themselves as the stronghold of
Enlightenment values and civilization and the anti-democratic and authoritarian
agenda of the supposedly uncivilized. For, For the defence of their imperial mode of
living93, the most emancipated, educated and privileged parts of society may be said
to rely on the political energies of the “threatened majority”94 which they mobilize in
order to organize the social and ecological exclusion on which their progressive under-
standings of subjectivity and self-realization vitally depend. A meta-critical approach as
sketched above, in contrast, is analytically more powerful. It is neither about romanti-
cizing an allegedly more democratic past when subjects where, supposedly, still auton-
omous95, nor does it ignore or deny that in present consumer societies there is a wealth
of initiatives, movements and discourses portraying themselves as the vanguard of
socio-ecological alternatives.96 But it sheds light, inter alia, on exactly this complicity
and the simultaneity of these practices of political outsourcing, on the one hand, and
the maintenance of progressive self-descriptions, on the other.
As regards the second point, the diagnosis of the dialectic of democracy may, indeed,
easily be misread as a deterministic and apologetic normative theory of the illiberal,
anti-egalitarian metamorphosis of democracy. The notions of second-order emancipa-
tion and democratic dysfunctionality, in particular, may appear anti-democratic or even
reactionary. To these concepts, Rancière’s critique of what he calls “incessant denuncia-
tions of the democratic”97 by “a dominant intelligentsia, whose situation is not
obviously desperate and who hardly aspire to live under diﬀerent laws”98 might be
fully applicable. In fact, Rancière strongly warns not to put the critical “machine into
reverse gear, inverting the logic of cause and eﬀect.”99 “The evils of which our democ-
racies suﬀer,” he stresses, “are primarily evils related to the insatiable appetite of oli-
garchs.”100 He thus reverts to the well-known argument that contemporary
democratic polities are not really democratic but “a solid alliance of State oligarchy
and economic oligarchy,”101 and that the problem is not rooted in democracy, but in
its absence. In this scenario, “the antidemocratic discourse of today’s intellectuals,”
he believes, just “adds the ﬁnishing touches to the consensual forgetting of democracy
that both state and economic oligarchies strive toward.”102 But the analysis above is not
about putting the critical machine in reverse gear, nor is it about the “consensual for-
getting of democracy.” It is about making the critical machine reﬂexive so that, inter
alia, it may reveal how the narratives of decivilization and the great regression contribute
themselves to the reproduction of what they claim to reject. Rancière, for his part, thus
only paves the way for an analysis of the dialectic of democracy, but he refuses to follow
it through and, instead, falls back into the logic of post-Marxist analysis. With the
reﬂexive erosion and repackaging of democracy’s normative core he, ultimately,
refuses to engage. But for democracy and democratization in liqueﬁed, digitalizing
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and in multiple ways profoundly unsustainable consumer democracies exactly this is
the crucial point.
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